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Conditions of Citizenship and Domicile in
Polish Restitution Regulations in Light of
European Law
RADOSŁAW WIŚNIEWSKI ∗
0F

I. INTRODUCTION
Polish restitution regulations, both proposed and currently in force,
employ conditions of citizenship and domicile in defining the categories
of persons authorized to obtain restitution benefits for property taken in
connection with World War II or after the war. Such conditions were
included in previous and current regulations concerning property
“beyond the Bug River,” i.e. property lost in connection with the postwar
change in Poland’s eastern borders. These conditions were included in
reprivatization bills proposed in Poland after 1989, including the only bill
in this area to be passed by the Polish parliament in March 2001, which
was subsequently vetoed by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski. 1
Conditions of citizenship and domicile are also found in the latest
reprivatization bill drafted by the Polish Ministry of Justice, dated
October 26, 2017, 2 which, at the time this article goes to press, is still at
the stage of inter-ministerial consultations at the Government Legislation
Center.
Conditioning entitlement to restitution benefits on citizenship or
domicile generates numerous controversies because the socio-political
changes occurring during and after World War II often required the
1F

2F

∗Lawyer in the Real Estate, Reprivatization and Private Client Practice at Wardynski & Partners,
Warsaw, and a PhD Candidate in the Department of Human Rights at the John Paul II Catholic
University of Lublin.
1. .See Decyzja Prezydenta RP w Sprawie Ustawy Reprywatyzacyjnej, PREZYDENT PL (Mar.
22, 2001), http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwalne-aktualnosci/rok-2001/art,15,decyzja-prezydentarp-w-sprawie-ustawy-reprywatyzacyjnej.html.
2. .Ustawa o zrekompensowaniu niektórych krzywd wyrządzonych osobom fizycznym
wskutek przejęcia nieruchomości lub zabytków ruchomych przez władze komunistyczne po 1944
[Law to Compensate for Some of the Harm Done to Individuals as a Result Taking Over Real
Estate or Movable Monuments by the Communist Authorities after 1944] (draft, Oct. 26, 2017)
(Pol.).
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former owners of property, or their family and heirs, to leave Poland,
which sometimes entailed the loss of Polish citizenship. Given the
complex postwar fate of persons who survived the war and in light of the
over forty years of the communist regime in Poland, when obtaining any
kind of restitution benefits was nearly impossible, to require the former
owners of property or their families and heirs to demonstrate Polish
citizenship or domicile in Poland appears unjust, particularly, with
respect to people forced by wartime or postwar turmoil to leave Poland.
But regardless of the social assessment of the use of conditions of
citizenship and domicile, such conditions continue to appear in both
proposed and existing Polish restitution regulations. The use of these
conditions is justified by the Polish authorities, on one hand, by the need
to create the possibility of obtaining restitution benefits only for persons
strongly tied to Poland and, on the other hand, by Poland’s financial
limitations as a country that, following the transformation in 1989, is still
striving to build its prosperity on the basis of a free-market economy. 3 At
the same time, this explanation seems inadequate in light of international
agreements binding on Poland, and in particular, acts of European law,
whose overriding principles are respect for human dignity, human rights,
equality, justice, and the rule of law. Moreover, the Terezin Declaration, 4
signed on June 30, 2009, by forty-six states (including Poland), which
addresses issues of restitution for property taken during and after the war
in detail, requires that regulations introduced in the area of restitution of
real property enable pursuit of restitution claims in a non-discriminatory
manner. The guidelines drafted for the Terezin Declaration on pursuit of
restitution claims to real property state that non-discriminatory restitution
and compensation processes should “inter alia . . . overcome citizenship
and residency requirements.” 5
Regardless of the general objections to the use of conditions of
citizenship and residence, on October 26, 2017, the drafters of the
comprehensive reprivatization bill for Poland decided to include these
criteria in the draft, apparently, 6 because the current regulations on
3F

4F

5F

6F

3. .Justification, 3.7 & 3.14, Ustawa o zrekompensowaniu niektórych krzywd wyrządzonych
osobom fizycznym wskutek przejęcia nieruchomości lub zabytków ruchomych przez władze
komunistyczne po 1944 [Law to Compensate for Some of the Harm Done to Individuals as a Result
Taking Over Real Estate or Movable Monuments by the Communist Authorities after 1944] (draft,
Oct. 26, 2017) (Pol.).
4. .HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, TEREZIN DECLARATION (June 30, 2009).
5. .Id.
6. .See Renata Krupa-Dąbrowska, Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości przygotowało nową wersję
projektu dużej ustawy reprywatyzacyjnej, RZECZPOSPOLITA, (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www
.rp.pl/Nieruchomosci/311279958-Ministerstwo-Sprawiedliwosci-przygotowalo-nowa-wersjeprojektu-duzej-ustawy-reprywatyzacyjnej.html.
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property in the former eastern borderlands have already been reviewed
by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in Strasbourg, the
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in Luxembourg, and
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. As a result of these examinations, the
regulations concerning property “beyond the Bug River” containing such
conditions were not found wanting with respect to their compliance with
the Polish Constitution 7 or standards imposed by European law.
Questions thus arise, including whether or not the conditions of
citizenship and domicile used in the regulations governing property in
former eastern lands were not undermined in the rulings of the
Constitutional Tribunal, whether the CJEU or the ECtHR is tantamount
to their universal compliance with standards of Polish and European law,
and consequently, whether or not they can be employed in a
comprehensive restitution law in Poland? Before reaching an affirmative
answer to this question, the nature and scope of regulations concerning
property “beyond the Bug River” and the criteria of Polish citizenship
and residence used in those regulations must be examined. For this
reason, I will first present the issue of property in former eastern lands
and the related mechanism for pursuit of restitution claims. Then, I will
examine, in detail, the conditions of citizenship and domicile included in
the regulations governing claims for property in former eastern lands and
how those conditions have been evaluated in the case law of the
Constitutional Tribunal and the two European courts.
7F

II. EASTERN LAND ACTS AS AN EXCEPTIONAL EXAMPLE OF RESTITUTION
REGULATIONS IN THE POLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
The territory of Poland in the interwar period differed significantly
from the area currently within the borders of Poland. On November 11,
1918, when Poland regained its independence after 123 years, the image
and conception of Polish borders was still uncertain and continued to be
shaped over the following years. A significant portion of the eastern
border of Poland was established pursuant to the Treaty of Riga of March
18, 1921, 8 under which the eastern border of Poland followed inter alia
the Zbrucz (Zbruch) and Dźwina (Daugava) rivers, and also included
lands east of the Bug River. This is why the territories of prewar Poland
east of the current border are commonly referred to as lands “beyond the
8F

7. .See Ustawa z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitution
of Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997] (1997 Dz. U. nr 78 poz. 483) (Pol.).
8. .Traktat pokoju między Polską a Rosją i Ukrainą podpisany w Rydze dnia 18 marca 1921
roku [Treaty of Peace Between Poland and Russia and Ukraine of March 18, 1921] (1921 Dz. U.
nr 49 poz. 300) (Pol.).
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Bug” (zabużańskie) and their prewar inhabitants are also referred to as
“people from beyond the Bug” (zabużanie).
These eastern lands were cut off from Poland after the end of World
War II. As a result of negotiations conducted before the end of the war
among the Great Powers (the Soviet Union, the United States, and the
United Kingdom), it was determined at Stalin’s express wish that the
lands of prewar Poland, east of the Curzon Line 9 (a modified version of
which corresponds to today’s eastern border of Poland), would fall to the
Soviet Union. Conclusion of the border agreement between Poland and
the USSR on August 16, 1945, 10 subsequently revised by the agreement
of February 15, 1951, 11 confirmed the previous arrangements agreed
upon by the Big Three. 12 In exchange, Poland received the prewar
German lands east of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers. Consequently,
Poland lost about a fifth of its prewar territory, resulting in mass
migrations of the population residing in eastern lands. 13
Resettlements of the population connected with removal of eastern
lands from Poland were carried out on the basis of “republic treaties,”
i.e., international agreements concluded after the war by Poland with the
Soviet republics bordering Poland. Agreements were concluded at that
time with the Soviet republics of Belarus, 14 Ukraine 15 and Lithuania, 16
9F

10F

11F

12F

13F

14F

15F

16F

9. .See Letter from Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, to Georgy Chicherin, People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (July 11, 1920)
(regarding the conception of a demarcation line between the Polish and Bolshevik armies proposed
during the Polish/Bolshevik War).
10. .See Umowa między Rzecząpospolitą Polską i Związkiem Socjalistycznych Republik
Radzieckich o polsko-radzieckiej granicy państwowej [Agreement between the Republic of Poland
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Polish-Soviet state border] (1947 Dz. U. nr 35
poz. 167) (Pol.)
11. .See Umowa pomiędzy Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Związkiem Socjalistycznych Republik
Radzieckich o zamianie odcinków terytoriów państwowych, podpisana dnia 15 lutego 1951 r.
(ratyfikowana zgodnie z ustawą z dnia 26 maja 1951 r.) [Agreement between the Republic of
Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the exchange of sections of state territories,
signed on February 15, 1951 (ratified in accordance with the Act of May 26, 1951).] (1952 Dz. U.
nr 11 poz. 63) (Pol.).
12. .See Tomasz Dubowski, Granica polsko-rosyjska jako granica zewnętrzna Unii
Europejskiej, BIAŁOSTOCKIE STUDIA PRAWNICZE, 80-81 (2011).
13. .See KRYSTYNA MICHNIEWICZ-WANIK, MIENIE ZABUŻAŃSKIE: PRAWNE PODSTAWY
REALIZACJI ROSZCZEŃ (2008).
14. .Agreement of September 9, 1944, between the Polish Committee of National Liberation
and the government of the Belarusian SSR on evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the
BSRR and the Belarusian population from the territory of Poland, Belr.-Pol., Sept. 9, 1944.
15. .Agreement of September 9, 1944, between the Polish Committee of National Liberation
and the government of the Ukrainian SSR on evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the
UkSRR and the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland, Pol.-Ukr., Sept. 9, 1944.
16. .Agreement of September 22, 1944, between the Polish Committee of National Liberation
and the government of the Lithuanian SSR on evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of
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and finally the USSR itself. 17 Under these agreements, the Polish
population residing in eastern lands were resettled to the current territory
of Poland, and in turn, the Belarusians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and
Rusyns residing in Polish territory were resettled to the east. The republic
treaties also provided various solutions in terms of settlement for property
left behind by resettled persons, and guaranteed arrivals in the
“Recovered Territories” (formerly German) that they would be allocated
land and a home left by the German population resettled from those
lands. 18 For this reason, it is accepted that the main goal of the guarantees
included in the republic treaties was to provide assistance to the resettled
Polish population, thus establishing conditions for facilitating their
existence inside the new, postwar borders of Poland. This is also why it
is recognized that the benefits awarded for properties in the east are in the
nature of public-law social benefits, and not private-law compensation. 19
Given the numerous doubts connected with the lack of ratification
and publication of these treaties, the obligations assumed by Poland under
international law, with respect to settlement for property left in the east,
were not susceptible to direct enforcement. 20 For this reason, these
17F

18F

19F

20F

the LSRR and the Lithuanian population from the Territory of Poland, Lith.-Pol., Sept. 22,
1944;these also Agreement of July 6, 1945, between the Provisional Government of National Unity
of the Republic of Poland and the government of the USSR on the right to change of Soviet
citizenship of persons of Polish and Jewish nationality residing in the USSR and their evacuation
to Poland and on the right to change of citizenship of persons of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian,
Rusyn and Lithuanian nationality residing in the territory of Poland and their evacuation to the
USSR, Pol.-USSR, July 6, 1945).
17. .Umowa między Rządem Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej a Rządem Związku
Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich w sprawie terminu i trybu dalszej repatriacji z ZSRR osób
narodowości polskiej [Agreement between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the date and mode of further
repatriation of persons of Polish nationality from the USSR] (1957 Dz. U. nr 47 poz. 222) (Pol.).
18. .See TOMASZ LUTEREK, REPRYWATYZACJA: ŹRÓDŁA PROBLEMU 259-261 (2016).
19. .See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 1/87, June 10, 1987 (Pol.);
Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 33/02, Dec. 19, 2002 (Pol.); Trybunał
Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 2/04, Dec. 15, 2004 (Pol.); Trybunał Konstytucyjny
[Constitutional Tribunal], SK 11/12, Oct. 23, 2012 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] I CR
768/73, Feb. 1, 1974 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III CZP 63/79, Oct. 10, 1979 (Pol.);
Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] III AZP 39/92, Feb 4, 1993 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny
[Supreme Administrative Court] OSK 606/11, Apr. 26, 2012 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny
[Supreme Administrative Court] I OSK 1856/12, May 21, 2013 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd
Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 2201/14, November 6, 2014 (Pol.);
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court] I OSK 1020/13, December 9, 2014
(Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], Case I OSK 1113/14,
February 18, 2016 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], Case I
OSK 2025/14, May 24, 2016 (Pol.).
20. .See Małgorzata Masternak-Kubiak, Glosa do wyroku TK z dnia 19 grudnia 2002 r., K
33/02 [Note on Constitutional Tribunal Judgment of December 19, 2002, Case K 33/02], 6
PAŃSTWO I PRAWO [STATE AND LAW] 119 (2003) (Pol.); see also Roman Kwiecień, Charakter
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obligations were incorporated into the national legal order after the war
and implemented on the basis of various acts of national law. 21 Until
October 2005, these solutions generally boiled down to a right of offset,
under which the price for acquisition of real estate (owned by the public
entities) would be reduced by the value of property left behind in the east.
This settlement for property left behind in the east did not take the form
of classic compensation for injury, but was understood as a type of public
assistance benefit for persons resettled from the east, helping them
organize their existence in postwar Poland. Thus, the settlement
obligations assumed by Poland in the republic treaties were in essence
more similar to public assistance benefits of a social nature than damages
in the traditional sense.
The setoff right was most often exercised by the eligible persons
during the initial resettlement period in the 1940s. Problems with the
exercise of the setoff right began along with successive waves of
21F

prawny i znaczenie umów repatriacyjnych z 9 i 22 września 1944 roku [The Legal Nature and
Significance of the Repatriation Agreements of September 9 and 22, 1944], 4 PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY
[JUDICIAL REV.] 17 (2005) (Pol.).
21. .See, e.g., Dekret z 6 grudnia 1946 r. o przekazaniu przez państwo mienia nierolniczego
na obszarze ziem odzyskanych i byłego Wolnego Miasta Gdańska [the Decree of December 6,
1946, on Transfer by the State of Non-agricultural Property in the Area of the Recovered Territories
and the Former Free City of Danzig] art. 9 (1946 Dz. U. nr 71 poz. 389) (Pol.); Dekret z 10 grudnia
1952 r. o cesji przez państwo nieruchomości nierolniczych na cele mieszkaniowe i budowę
indywidualnych domów jednorodzinnych [Decree of December 10, 1952, on Cession by the State
of Non-agricultural Real Property for Residential Purposes and Construction of Individual Singlefamily Houses] art. 14 (1952 Dz. U. nr 49 poz. 326) (Pol.); Dekret z 18 kwietnia 1955 r. w sprawie
uwłaszczenia i uregulowania innych spraw związanych z reformą rolną i rozliczeniem rolnictwa
[Decree of April 18, 1955, on Enfranchisement and Regulation of Other Matters Connected with
Agricultural Reform and Agricultural Settlement] art. 12 (1955 Dz. U. nr 18 poz. 107) (Pol.);
Ustawa o sprzedaży przez państwo budynków mieszkalnych i działek budowlanych z 28 maja 1957
[Act on Sale by the State of Residential Houses and Construction Plots of May 28, 1957] art. 8
(1957 Dz. U. nr 31 poz. 132) (Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami w miastach i majątkach [Act
on Management of Land in Cities and Estates of July 14, 1961] art. 17b (1961 Dz. U. nr 32 poz.
159) (Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami i wywłaszczaniu nieruchomości [Act on Management
of Land and Expropriation of Real Estate of Apr. 29, 1985] art. 88 (1985 Dz. U. nr 22 poz. 99)
(Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce nieruchomościami Skarbu Państwa przejęta od Sił Zbrojnych
Federacji Rosyjskiej [Act on Management of Real Estate of the State Treasury Taken Over from
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of June 10, 1994] art. 16 (1997 Dz. U. nr 70 poz. 363)
(Pol.); Ustawa o gospodarce nieruchomościami [Real Estate Management Act of Aug. 21, 1997]
art. 212 (1997 Dz. U. nr 115 poz. 741) (Pol.); Ustawa o przekształceniu prawa użytkowania
wieczystego przysługującego osobom fizycznym w prawo własności [Act on Conversion of the
Right of Perpetual Usufruct Held by Natural Persons into the Right of Ownership of Sep. 4, 1997]
art. 6 (1997 Dz. U. nr 123 poz. 781) (Pol.); Ustawa o stosowaniu się do ceny sprzedaży lub opłat
za wieczyste użytkowanie nieruchomości Skarbu Państwa o wartości nieruchomości pozostawionej
poza bieżącymi granicami państwa polskiego [Act on Application Toward the Sale Price or Fees
for Perpetual Usufruct of Real Estate of the State Treasury of the Value of Real Estate Left Beyond
the Current Borders of the Polish State of Dec. 12, 2003] (2003 Dz. U. nr 6 poz 39) (Pol.).
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resettlements 22 in the 1950s and later, when further regulations governing
the right of setoff imposed numerous conditions on eligible persons
which had to be fulfilled for them to exercise their right of setoff. 23 The
growing restrictions on the exercise of setoff rights led to a situation
where the exercise of this right was the exception rather than the rule.
Moreover, when it was possible to exercise the right of setoff, the factual
and legal state of the real property offered to the holders of this right was
so complicated or problematic that holders often abandoned their exercise
of the right of setoff. Under those circumstances, the right of setoff
became an illusory legal institution (ius nudum), as the conditions for
exercising it prevented its effective realization. 24
The applicant in Broniowski v. Poland, 25 in which the ECtHR
decided for the first time to issue a pilot judgment, struggled with similar
problems. Under the facts of that case, the applicant’s grandmother was
resettled after the war from land now in Ukraine. The applicant’s mother
managed to exercise the right of setoff inherited from her mother by
acquiring real property worth barely two percent of the value of the
property left behind in the east by her mother. In subsequent years, after
long proceedings, when the applicant finally managed to reach a situation
where he could exercise the remaining right of setoff, the property offered
to him for this purpose had such a complicated factual and legal state
(among other things, requiring significant investments in the property or
located in a distant part of the country of no interest to the applicant) that
he ultimately abandoned his exercise of the right of setoff. Moreover,
further regulations concerning property “beyond the Bug” prevented
exercise of the right of setoff by holders who, like the applicant, had
already exercised the right of setoff in any manner regardless of the value
of the real estate acquired through this procedure. In this situation, the
ECtHR concluded that the regulations in the Polish legal system and the
practice for exercise of the right of setoff reduced it to an illusory right,
resulting in Poland’s violation of the applicant’s right of property (the
22F

23 F

24F

25F

22. .See MICHNIEWICZ-WANIK, supra note 13.
23. .See generally Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], I CK 323/02, Nov. 21, 2003 (Pol.) (in
which the court describes in detail the circumstances limiting the possibility of exercising the right
of setoff, indicating that this provides grounds for a claim for damages against the State Treasury).
24. .See Jan Mojak, Glosa do uchwały SN z dnia 22 czerwca 1989 r., III CZP 32/89 [Comment
on Supreme Court Resolution of June 22, 1989, Case III CZP 32/89), 1 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 1991,
119; see also K 33/02 at 1.
25. .Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 185-187.
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peaceful enjoyment of possessions) 26 guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol
1 27 to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). 28
In light of the structural problems of the Polish legal system with
the realization that claims for eastern properties affect a large portion of
the entitled persons, the ECtHR decided for the first time in the
Broniowski case to apply the procedure of a pilot judgment. 29 Thus, the
court also required Poland to implement solutions enabling effective
realization of “Bug River claims” (as the court calls them) in a manner
consistent with the standards of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. The
aim of issuing a pilot judgment was not only to resolve the applicant’s
specific case, 30 but also to impose an obligation for a systemic solution
to the problem with Bug River claims. This, in turn, could reduce the
number of identical claims pending before the ECtHR 31 and, in the longer
term, reduce the number of new applications filed with the court in
similar cases.
The immediate result of the judgment in Broniowski v. Poland 32 was
the adoption of the Act on Realization of the Right to Compensation for
Real Property Left Beyond the Current Borders of the Republic of Poland
of July 8, 2005 (2005 Dz. U. no. 169 item 1418, as amended—
hereinafter the “2005 Act”). The 2005 Act introduced an alternative to
realization of Bug River claims in the form of a setoff, by enabling right
holders to apply for monetary compensation. In this respect the 2005 Act
limited the ability to realize Bug River claims to twenty percent of the
26F

27F

28F

29F

30F

31F

32F

26. .See id.
27. .See Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, March 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (promulgated in Poland under 1995 Dz. U. nr 36
poz. 175 (Pol.)).
28. .See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (promulgated in Poland under1993 Dz. U. nr 61 poz. 284) (Pol.)).
29. .For more on the pilot judgment procedure, see FREDERIC SUDRE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
ET EUROPEEN DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 848 (2012) (Fr.).
30. .Broniowski’s case ended in 2005 in a friendly settlement with the Polish government,
under which Broniowski was awarded monetary compensation under the same terms as adopted in
the act passed as a result of issuance of the pilot judgment, i.e. compensation equal to 20% of the
value of real property left in the east by his grandmother, notwithstanding prior exercise of the right
of setoff equal to 2% of the value of the lost property. As a result of the settlement, the ECtHR
struck the case from the list of pending cases. See Broniowski, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; see also
Magda Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, Sprawy mienia zabużańskiego przed ETPCz (Bug River
Property Case Before the ECtHR), 12 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY 23 (2008) (Pol.).
31. .The ECtHR registrar announced the reduction in the number of identical cases resulting
from issuance of the pilot judgment in Broniowski v. Poland in two press releases on December 12,
2007 and October 6, 2008 . See Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Bug River Cases
Resolved (Dec. 12, 2007); see also Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, First ‘Pilot
Judgment’ Procedure Brought to a Successful Conclusions: Bug River Cases Closed (Oct. 6, 2008).
32. .See Broniowski, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

12/19/2018 3:14 PM

537

Conditions of Citizenship and Domicile

value of property left in the east. Thus right holders may seek realization
of the right of setoff or seek payment of compensation equal to twenty
percent of the value of former eastern properties.
The 2005 Act entered into force on October 7, 2005, and in 2007 the
ECtHR found in Wolkenberg v. Poland 33 and Witkowska-Toboła v.
Poland 34 that the aims of the pilot project in Broniowski were being
achieved. 35 The court held that the mechanism for pursuing Bug River
claims applied in the 2005 Act met the standards under Article 1 of
Protocol 1 to the ECHR. In this context, the court pointed out that Poland
had a wide margin of appreciation in regulating the method of pursuing
Bug River claims, and within that discretion, the mechanism applied in
the 2005 Act was reasonable, proportionate, and struck a fair balance
between the protection of the claimants’ property rights and the general
interest. 36 The Strasbourg judges stressed that the level of compensation
for Bug River claims set in the 2005 Act, twenty percent of the value of
the property left behind, was fair, particularly considering that the loss of
the real estate in the east did not result from any act or omission of the
Polish authorities but resulted from the political arrangements by the
Great Powers that were connected with defining the postwar borders of
Poland. 37 The ECtHR also noted that the settlement for property left in
the east was in the nature of aid rather than restitution, which provided
further justification for limiting the level of payment of Bug River claims
to twenty percent of the value of the properties left in the east. 38
The history of the regulations governing Bug River claims reveals
the exceptional nature of these regulations within the Polish legal system.
33F

34F

35F

36F

37F

38F

33. .Wolkenberg v. Poland, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 72-77 (2007).
34. .Witkowska-Toboła v. Poland, App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 74-79 (2007).
35. .See Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska supra note 30, 22-25 (raising serious doubts as to the
complete success of the pilot judgment in Broniowski v. Poland.) The use of this procedure led to
adoption of the 2005 Act in Poland, but until it was adopted nothing happened in many of the Bug
River cases pending before the ECtHR, see id. The author thus seems to suggest that the success
from the court’s perspective was the systemic solution to the issue, as a result of which the number
of cases and incoming applications was reduced, see id. But from the perspective of protection of
individual rights, the applicants could expect only significant percentage limitation on their claims,
while the one advantage was the assurance of being able to obtain monetary compensation, see id.
But the latter solution, the author suggests, could have been achieved in any event without the
judgment from the Strasbourg court, in light of the legislative work underway at the same time and
the development of the Polish case law inclining toward monetary satisfaction of Bug River claims,
see id.
36. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64, 66; see also Witkowska-Tobola,
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 66-67.
37. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 63; see also Witkowska-Tobola,
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 65.
38. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64; see also Witkowska-Tobola,
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 66.
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This exceptional nature consists, first and foremost, of the fact that this is
one of the few examples of restitution regulations aimed at satisfying
claims arising out of the seizure of real property after World War II. As
the conference sessions clearly show, Poland lacks comprehensive
systemic solutions for satisfaction of restitution claims for the seizure of
property after World War II. Instead of the reprivatization act demanded
for years, claimants pursue their rights in ad hoc proceedings based on
general instruments of private and public law. 39 On the other hand, the
uniqueness of the regulations governing property “beyond the Bug” also
arises from the very source and nature of the benefits that can be obtained
through settlement for properties left in the east. As articulated by the
ECtHR, Bug River claims take their original source not in acts or
omissions of the Polish authorities, but in postwar political arrangements
by the Great Powers. In addition, the Strasbourg judges perceived the
assistance-based nature of the benefits available when pursuing Bug
River claims, which are not aimed at full compensation for the financial
loss connected with the loss of Bug River property but at the mitigation
of the effects of resettlement. 40 For these reasons, the regulations
governing Bug River claims cannot be regarded as an example of
restitution regulations in the classic sense, which are aimed at redressing
the injury arising out of seizure of property after World War II. Due to
the exceptional nature of the Bug River claims, the solutions followed in
the current 2005 Act should be carefully analyzed before replicating them
in other laws. This observation also applies to the conditions of
citizenship and domicile, which, as examples of exceptional solutions,
should be applied with particular caution in other types of restitution
regulations, as I will discuss later in this article.
39F

40F

III. CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP IN EASTERN LAND ACTS
Holding Polish citizenship (both at the start of the war and at the
time of assertion of the demand) as a criterion for pursuing Bug River
claims was not introduced into the Polish regulations governing
properties left in the east until 2003. But this does not mean that the
condition of Polish citizenship is not bound up with the occurrence and
nature of Bug River claims. 41
41F

39. .See Ewa Łętowska, Orzecznictwo sądowe jako instrument reprywatyzacji
zdekoncentrowanej, in STUDIA I ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO TOM III 86 (Mateusz Pilich ed.,
2016).
40. .See Wolkenberg, App. No. 50003/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 63; see also Witkowska-Tobola,
App. No. 11208/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 65.
41. .See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 84/90, Apr. 10, 1991 (Pol.).
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The use in national regulations of Polish citizenship as a condition
for enforcing Bug River claims was challenged in 2004 in a proceeding
before the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. 42 In that case, the tribunal
pointed out that, despite failure for over fifty years to employ the
condition of citizenship in the national regulations governing Bug River
property, the condition of Polish citizenship was strongly accented in the
republic treaties which conditioned the possibility of settlement for
property left in the east on holding Polish citizenship as of September
1939. The tribunal found that the essence of this requirement for claims
was the desire to ensure living conditions enabled resettled Polish citizens
to begin their lives over again in a new location within the postwar
borders of Poland. In the tribunal’s view, the ratio legis for the criterion
of holding Polish citizenship reveals the social nature of the benefits
obtained through exercise of Bug River claims, which, by their nature,
are closer to public-law aid benefits than to civil-law damages. Moreover,
in the tribunal’s view, the external nature of the circumstances
surrounding the original causes of the resettlement of Polish citizens and
the principles behind the claims for properties left in the east justify the
use of the criterion of Polish citizenship in the mechanism for pursuing
Bug River claims. Thus, in light of the specific circumstances of the
sources of the postwar actions of resettling the Polish population, as well
as the exceptional public-law nature of the benefits received in exercise
of Bug River claims, the Constitutional Tribunal ultimately held that the
condition of Polish citizenship for pursuing Bug River claims is
consistent with the Polish Constitution.
Interestingly, in the context of the constitutionality of the
requirement to hold Polish citizenship, the Constitutional Tribunal also
cited the principle of the citizens’ trust in the state and affirmed that this
principle applies directly only to Polish citizens, confirming the
consistency with the principle of the condition of holding Polish
citizenship. The tribunal added that the principle of citizens’ trust in the
state with respect to the criterion of Polish citizenship could be relied on
by a non-citizen only, secondarily, in terms of equal treatment of citizens
and non-citizens, for example, under EU law. This issue later became the
subject of analysis by the CJEU under the procedure for obtaining a
preliminary ruling. But the Luxembourg court did not analyze the
criterion of holding Polish citizenship in September 1939 on the part of
resettled persons and examined the issue of the requirement to hold Polish
42F

42. .See K 2/04 at 2.
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citizenship also by heirs asserting claims of resettled persons who had a
right of setoff under the regulations governing property beyond the Bug.
In the Teisseyre case, 43 two grandchildren of a woman who was
resettled in Poland sought payment of compensation under the 2005 Act
for the property left in the east by their grandmother, who held Polish
citizenship. One of the grandchildren held Polish citizenship and was
awarded compensation, while the other was denied compensation
because he lacked Polish citizenship. He was a Finnish citizen who had
never resided in Poland. Under these facts, the Supreme Administrative
Court, hearing a complaint against the refusal to award compensation due
to the lack of Polish citizenship by one of the heirs of the resettled owner,
sought a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the compatibility
of this requirement of the 2005 Act with the prohibition of discrimination
on grounds of nationality provided for in Article 18 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. 44 Examining its jurisdiction to take
up the case, the Court of Justice stated that the prohibition in Article 18
TFEU concerns discrimination within the scope of application of the
Treaties, including the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties,
and in particular, the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the
member states under Article 21 TFEU. 45 Beyond that, the court
recognized that the subject matter of the case and the 2005 Act lies within
the exclusive competence of the member states, 46 s the aim of the concept
of EU citizenship under Article 20 TFEU is not to expand the scope of
application of the Treaties to matters unrelated to the law of the European
Union (“EU”). 47 Because the grandson resided in Finland, and never in
Poland, the Court of Justice found that the case had no connection with
situations covered by the Treaty provisions concerning the free
movement of people, including Article 21 TFEU. 48 Consequently, the
Court held that it clearly lacked jurisdiction to reply to the question
referred by the Supreme Administrative Court.
While the Court of Justice found that the ratione materiae did not
justify taking the case, this does not mean that the condition of Polish
citizenship in the Polish regulations governing Bug River claims is
43F

44F

45F

46F

47F

48F

43. .Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2033 (Court of
Justice order of June 19, 2014).
44. .See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 18, 2012 O.J. C 326/1.
45. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 31.
46. .See AURELIA NOWICKA & STANISLAW SOŁTYSIŃSKI, REFLEKSJE NA TEMAT
REKOMPENSAT ZA MIENIE ZNACJONALIZOWANE PO II WOJNIE ŚWIATOWEJ 56 (M Mateusz Pilich
ed.).
47. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 32–33.
48. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 34.
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clearly consistent with EU law, or the prohibition on discrimination on
grounds of nationality set forth in EU law. As expressly stated by the
Luxembourg judges, the principal basis for the order was that the case
lacked a connection with the free flow of persons under the facts of the
case, namely that the heir of the resettled owner who was not a Polish
citizen had not resided in Poland. A contratrio, it may be assumed that
under different circumstances, if the heir lacking Polish citizenship had
exercised the right to move freely within the territory of the member
states and resided in Poland, then the Court of Justice would be inclined
to take the case. 49
Additionally, it has been pointed out that a ruling on the merits by
the Court of Justice would also have been possible if another of the Treaty
freedoms were raised, namely the free flow of capital set forth in
Article 63 TFEU. 50 It is accepted in the case law of the CJEU that
inheritance is an example of the flow of capital of a personal nature. 51
However, limiting this type of flow of capital due to the type of
citizenship held could manifest discrimination on grounds of nationality,
as referred to in Article 18 TFEU. 52 Thus, it cannot be ruled out that in
the future, notwithstanding the order in Teisseyre, the Court of Justice
will provide a reply on the merits as to the condition of citizenship in the
Polish regulations governing Bug River claims, where it might conclude
that a limitation of this type violates the EU’s prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality.
It should be pointed out that when issuing the order in the Teisseyre
case, in the description of the facts, the Court of Justice also noted the
exceptional, public-law and assistance-related nature of the benefits
obtainable by pursuing Bug River claims. 53 So, even if a merits ruling
were to be issued in the future where the Court of Justice upheld the
compatibility with EU law of the use of the criterion of citizenship in
Polish regulations governing Bug River claims, the exceptional nature of
restitution regulations awarding claimants public-law benefits in the
nature of assistance, rather than civil-law damages, would have to be
borne in mind.
Currently, it would not be correct to claim that the Court of Justice
has accepted the use of the condition of citizenship in the Polish
49F

50F

51F

52 F

53F

49. .See NOWICKA & SOŁTYSIŃSKI, supra note 46, at 53–54.
50. .See Maciej Taborowski, Mienie zabużańskie nie dla Trybunału Sprawiedliwości?
[Territorial Property not for the Court of Justice?], 155 RADCA PRAWNY 39, 40 (Pol.).
51. .See Case C-513/03, Hilten-van der Heijden, ECLI:EU:C:2206:131, 40 (Court of Justice
judgement of Feb. 23, 2006).
52. .See Taborowski, supra note 50, at 40.
53. .See Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 10–11.
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restitution regulations as compatible with the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality. First and foremost, given the
procedural nature of the order issued in Teisseyre, as of now, there is no
merits ruling by the Luxembourg court on this issue. Even if such a ruling
were issued, the holding would have to be analyzed in light of the
exceptional nature of the regulations governing Bug River claims.
IV. CONDITION OF DOMICILE IN EASTERN LAND ACTS
As with the condition of citizenship, the condition of domicile (the
need to have resided in Poland in September 1939 and now) was not
included in the national regulations governing Bug River claims until
2003. Unlike the criterion of citizenship, residence in Poland was not an
explicit requirement under the republic treaties. Nonetheless, the
condition of residing in prewar Polish lands falls within the range of
principles underlying settlement for property left behind in the east as a
form of assistance for the Polish population, who, because of the change
in borders, had to be resettled and lost their previous place of residence
in eastern lands. For this reason, in 2004, the Constitutional Tribunal held
that the criterion of place of residence, in light of its link to the ratio legis
of the regulations governing settlement for property left in the east, is
consistent with the Polish Constitution. 54 In the same judgment, however,
the tribunal found that requiring claimants to reside in Poland today, as
of a strictly defined date (i.e. the date of entry into force of the
regulations), was not relevant to the obligation to settle for property left
in the east, and consequently, this requirement was held to be
unconstitutional. 55 For this reason as well, in the 2005 Act, the criterion
of domicile was included only with respect to the period when the war
broke out, in the form of a requirement of residence in the former
territories of Poland as of September 1, 1939. With the condition of
domicile constructed in this manner, the Constitutional Tribunal issued
another judgment in 2012, holding that it arbitrarily established access to
the benefits provided by the 2005 Act by conditioning such benefits on
the incidental fact of residing in the former territories of Poland on
September 1, 1939. 56 In the tribunal’s view, setting such an exact date as
the legally relevant moment for determining the criterion of domicile
could deprive persons of the benefit of the 2005 Act, who, despite not
residing in the former territory of Poland on that exact date, nonetheless
lost the center of their life interests due to the war and the following
54F

55F

56F

54. .See K 2/04 at 2.
55. .See id.
56. .See SK 11/12 at 23.
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resettlement from the east. 57 Thus, the tribunal held that the criterion of
domicile in this form was unconstitutional. Consequently, the 2005 Act
was amended in 2014 so that the requirement of residence in the former
territory of Poland would not be limited to any specific date. Thus, the
2005 Act retains the condition of domicile, determining the social nature
of the Bug River claims with respect to Polish citizens who lost their place
of residence as a result of resettlement. However, this criterion now
extends the operation of the Bug River regulations to all persons
potentially entitled to the assistance benefits provided for in the
regulations. 58
So far, neither the CJEU, nor the ECtHR has examined the
compatibility of the condition of domicile in the Bug River regulations
with standards of European law. Although the conclusions in the Court
of Justice order in the Teisseyre case, discussed in the previous section,
were focused on the criterion of citizenship, the arguments raised in that
case also referred indirectly to issues connected to the place of residence.
First and foremost, in the request for a preliminary ruling in that case, 59
the Supreme Administrative Court cited the ruling by the Court of Justice
in Tas-Hagen and Tas. 60 In that judgment, the Luxembourg court held
that the requirement that Dutch citizens establish permanent residence in
the Netherlands in order to become beneficiaries of the assistance benefits
paid to civilian victims of the war violated the EU’s prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The Court of Justice concluded
that the citizenship requirement was sufficient to demonstrate a
connection between the recipients of assistance benefits and the society
of the member state awarding the benefits. The additional requirement of
domicile had no rational justification and imposed disproportionate
conditions for access to the social benefits. 61
57F

58F

59F

60F

61F

57. .See id.
58. .See Piotr Nycz, Zamieszkiwanie na byłym terytorium Polski jako przesłanka otrzymania
rekompensaty z tytułu pozostawienia nieruchomości poza obecnymi granicami Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej [Residence in the former territory of Poland as a condition for receiving compensation for
real estate left beyond the current borders of the Republic of Poland], 12 PREGLAD SĄDOWY 85,
92 (Pol.).
59. .See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 2024/11,
Apr. 30, 2013 (Pol.).
60. .See Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas, ECLI:EU:C:2006:676 (Court of Justice
judgment of Oct. 26, 2006); see also Case C-370/13, Teisseyre v. Minister of Treasury, 37 (holding
that it was not justified to rely on the judgment in Tas-Hagen and Tas, as the Tases were citizens
of the Netherlands residing in that member state before exercising the freedom of movement and
settling in another member state, Spain, while Teisseyre, who did not hold Polish citizenship,
resided in Finland and had never resided in Poland).
61. .See Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas, 38–40.
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The issue of the place of residence during the period of receipt of
social benefits intended for victims of war and persecution was also
analyzed by the Court of Justice in the Nerkowska case. 62 In the court’s
view, Polish citizenship and prolonged residence in Poland by a recipient
of assistance benefits for victims of war manifested sufficient ties of the
beneficiary with Poland as a member state awarding social benefits to its
citizens, even if the beneficiary exercised the freedom to move and took
up residence in another member state. 63 Thus, the court deemed the
condition of having a place of residence in Poland for the period of
collecting assistance benefits for victims of war by Polish citizens
residing in other member states as incompatible with the principle of
proportionality, and held that this condition does not comply with the
EU’s ban on discrimination on grounds of nationality.
Despite the lack of findings by the CJEU and ECtHR on the
permissibility of the criterion of domicile in the Bug River regulations,
the conditions for permissibility of the use of the condition of place of
residence when regulating access to assistance benefits for victims of
war, which falls within the competence of the EU member states, may be
cited. These considerations lead to the conclusion that access to social
benefits awarded by the member states may be conditioned on a
connection between the beneficiaries and the member state awarding the
benefits. However, establishing the criteria for verifying the strength of
this connection requires particular care and weighing of the interests of
society and the potential beneficiaries. In the judgments cited above, the
Court of Justice held that conditioning the receipt of social benefits for
victims of war on both citizenship and domicile may be disproportionate
and violate the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality.
Thus, simultaneous employment of the conditions of residence and
citizenship when establishing the conditions for access to assistance
benefits in EU member states may be permissible only in exceptional
circumstances justifying such a combination of criteria. The resettlements
connected with the postwar change in Poland’s borders may be regarded
as such an exceptional set of circumstances to justify the combined use
of citizenship and domicile during the resettlement period, as provided in
the current wording of the 2005 Act. The public-law nature of the
assistance benefits available under the 2005 Act enables the acceptance
of the simultaneous use of both of these conditions when determining the
applicants’ connection to the fortunes of the Polish population resettled
62F

63F

62. .Case C-499/06, Nerkowska v. ZUS, ECLI:EU:C:2008:300 (Court of Justice judgment of
May 22, 2008).
63. .See Case C-499/06, Nerkowska v. ZUS, 43.
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from the east following the war and consequently eligible for assistance.
Therefore, it is the social character of the benefits and the exceptional
nature of the circumstances for awarding such benefits that are the
decisive factors permitting the member state to use the place of residence
as an eligibility criterion.
V. SUMMARY
The analysis presented here allows for a few summary remarks.
First, the regulations governing property beyond the Bug are an
exceptional example of restitution regulations in the Polish legal system.
This results from the absence of comprehensive restitution regulations in
Poland, as well as, the specific context in which properties in Poland’s
former eastern lands were lost. Unlike the seizure of property in the
postwar territory of Poland as a result of acts or omissions by the Polish
authorities, the Bug River properties were left in the east as a result of
arrangements by the Great Powers as to the postwar borders of Poland,
independent of the Polish authorities. The exceptionality of the Bug River
regulations is further evident in the public-law nature of the assistance
benefits that could be obtained under these regulations. In view of these
exceptional aspects, the ECtHR held that the mechanism for pursuing
Bug River claims set forth in the 2005 Act is consistent with the standards
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human
Rights. But this does not mean that any restitution regulation employing
similar solutions would automatically be consistent with the ECHR
standards for protection of the right to property.
Second, use of the conditions of citizenship and domicile in
regulating access to Bug River benefits has not yet been evaluated on the
merits as to its compliance with standards of European law. Nonetheless,
the existing CJEU case law permits the use of the condition of citizenship
or domicile in light of the special nature of social benefits, whose
regulation lies within the competence of the member states. But the
simultaneous use of the conditions of citizenship and domicile must be
justified by extraordinary circumstances, as the decisions by the Court of
Justice indicate that requiring combined fulfillment of both of these
criteria may lead to a finding of a violation of the EU’s prohibition against
discrimination on grounds of nationality.
Third, the exceptional nature of the regulations governing Bug River
property and the permissibility of employing citizenship and domicile as
conditions for obtaining those assistance benefits excludes the possibility
of incorporating the solutions from the Bug River regulations,
particularly the criteria of citizenship and place of residence, in a
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comprehensive reprivatization act. That would unjustifiably equate the
aims and character of these two regimes. The aim of the Bug River
regulations was to carry out an intergovernmental obligation of Poland
involving the award of assistance benefits of a public-law nature to the
resettled Polish population from the east, while the aim of a
comprehensive reprivatization regulation should be to award damages of
a private-law nature. Thus carrying over the conditions of citizenship and
domicile to the bill for a reprivatization act dated October 26, 2017,
erroneously equates the aims and legal nature of this proposed act with
the regulations governing Bug River properties. For this reason as well,
their use in the proposed reprivatization act does not ensure compliance
with standards of European law, and to the contrary, may lead to a finding
that they are incompatible with the standards arising under the law of the
Council of Europe and the European Union.

